

HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

Philosophy

**GPHI 6018 (Fall)
GPHI 6022 (Spring)**

Professor J M Bernstein

Reading List, Course Description, and MiniCommentary Questions

Course Description

This course will be devoted to a reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Of particular concern will be Hegel's 'completion' of Kant's Copernican Turn, and thus the development of a nonskeptical idealism. In carrying out this project, Hegel makes three fundamental gestures, each of which is fateful for contemporary thought: (i) he attempts to demonstrate that full, human selfconsciousness requires intersubjectivity; (ii) that the emergence of selfconsciousness, and thus of philosophy as a reflective discipline, occurs historically; and (iii) that fundamental categories that make experience possible are practical and ethical rather than epistemic or theoretical.

In the Fall semester, we will first briefly look at Hegel's early essay "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate." At the center of this essay is an account of the dialectic of intersubjectivity which operates according to what has come to be called "the causality of fate." Although Hegel comes to believe that the metaphysical presuppositions posited herein for the causality of fate doctrine are false, its operation provides the orientation for the ethical project of the Phenomenology. The goal of the Phenomenology is to restructure the presuppositions of the causality of fate doctrine so that they are compatible with the fundamental feature of modernity, viz., our freedom from the authority of nature, hence the self-determining character of subjectivity. The remainder of the semester will be devoted to reading the first half of the Phenomenology: Introduction, Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and the first half of the chapter on Reason. The famous Preface to the book will not be studied till the end of the course. The two cruxes of the first part of the book are the overcoming of the standpoint of representational knowing, and the account of intersubjectivity in the dialectic of master-slave. The Bataille/Derrida objections to Hegel's account will be considered.

In the Spring semester, we will complete the reading of the chapter on Reason, before going forward to examine the discussions of Spirit, Religion, Absolute Knowing, and the Preface. Within the chapter on Spirit, particular emphasis will be given to the famous discussion of Antigone, the French Revolution, and the critique of Kant's moral philosophy. The end of the chapter on Spirit, on evil and forgiveness, is for me the key to the text as a whole. I construe the chapter on Religion as a defense of atheism.

Assessment

Students are required to complete at least four minicommentaries and one term paper in each semester. Each semester's work will be evaluated separately. You may write more than four mini-commentaries. Mini-commentaries are marked on a strictly Pass/Fail basis; in order to receive a grade for the semester you must have four passes. The final mark for each semester's work will be based on the term paper alone. The minicommentaries are supposed to be brief accounts (no more than three double-spaced pages = 750 words) of the topic or part of the topic covered in one of the seminars. Mini-commentaries should be accurate and clear accounts of what Hegel says in your own words. Mini-commentaries are thus wholly exegetical; interpretative originality, critical evaluation, or your views on the topic are not expected. Mini-commentaries are not short essays, but the exegetical building-blocks for longer pieces of writing. The first minicommentary must be submitted by week 3, the second by week 6, the third by week 9, the final one by week 12 in each semester. The secondary reading indicated in the bibliography is not essential and need only be referred to insofar as it helps in relation to specific points. However, each student will want to own at least one general commentary to provide guidance and orientation. The sample questions are offered as (optional) ways of giving the commentaries a sense of direction. Students are expected to come up with a topic for their term paper themselves. Topics for term papers must be approved by me, and they must be registered with me no later than December 1 for the Fall semester, and no later than April 15 for the Spring semester. Essays are due on the day of our final class meeting each semester.

Text

— Hegel, On Christianity: Early Theological Writings

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford).

The seminars will presume familiarity with the material to be covered in them; to this end it is essential to read prior to the lecture the relevant passages of the text indicated below.

Recommended Commentaries

H.S. Harris, Hegel's Ladder, 2 volumes (Hackett).

J. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Northwestern, paper)

Q. Lauer, A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Fordham, paper)

M. Westphal, History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Humanities Press paper)

I. Flay Hegel's Quest for Certainty (SUNY Press, paper)

— R. Pippin, Hegel's Idealism (CUP, paper)

J. Stewart (ed.), The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader (SUNY paper)

R. Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (SUNY paper)

T. Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (CUP paper)

Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (Routledge paper)

John Russon, Reading Hegel's Phenomenology (Indiana paper)

Harris' commentary is the fruit of thirty years research, and fifteen years in the writing; it is easily the most comprehensive account of the Phenomenology yet to be written. Harris provides a short re-statement of the argument of each paragraph of the text, and then a commentary on it. In the manner of Hyppolite, Harris attempts to provide historical concretion for each shape of consciousness that Hegel discusses abstractly, thus attempting to tie together the logic of Hegel's argument with its claim that every shape of consciousness has been historically actual. Because he is so detailed, students will find Harris of most help once they have a general grasp of the overall movement of any particular section. This book includes the most comprehensive bibliography on the Phenomenology in English. Hyppolite's book is one of the classic commentaries on the Phenomenology and although it is sometimes rather imaginative, it is almost always stimulating. Whereas Hyppolite is generous in his provision of reference to other authors as well as to Hegel's early writings, Lauer confines himself to the text, which he covers more systematically. The major fault of Lauer's book is that it tends towards mere paraphrase so that it does not in fact provide an articulated reading of Hegel. Stern's book is probably the best introductory commentary available; it can be relied on to provide at least solid theoretical orientation where it is needed; it is probably the best commentary to read before immersing oneself in the text itself. Westphal's book is much the easiest to read, more introductory than the other three, and perhaps more helpful in setting out Hegel's overall strategy; but it only offers a sketch, is unlikely to help with a difficult passage and is more selective in its treatment of topics than one would wish. Flay's book may not be a detailed commentary, but in addition to offering an interpretation and critical discussion of the Phenomenology, the notes provide an invaluable survey of the secondary literature on Hegel. Pinkard's commentary is much more in the mode of rational reconstruction, following through for the whole text the "completion of Kant" line of interpretation begun in Pippin's book, which is still the best account of the relation between Kant's and Fichte's transcendental idealism and Hegel's objective idealism. Pinkard's account of the "sociality of reason" is a useful way through the text. Williams sings pretty much the same song as Pippin and Pinkard, but his account is more focused on the "recognition" issue than is theirs, and more accessible. Stewart's reader presents a nice selection of essays that, roughly, cover of the main sections of the book. It diversity viewpoints provides accessible way of avoiding a monological interpretation of the text. I have placed all the other leading commentaries on three day reserve in the Library.

Four further books which can be found in the library and which might serve as partial commentaries in place of those listed above are

Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel (Oxford University)

Joseph Navickas, Consciousness and Reality: Hegel's Philosophy of Subjectivity (Nijhof)

Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge University) Chapters 48.

Michael N. Forster, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit (Chicago)

Mention should also be made of Kojève's highly influential but idiosyncratic study Introduction

to the Reading of Hegel, Gadamer's Hegel's Dialectic, and Heidegger's Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. None of them covers more than a small part of the text which we shall be studying, but all of them would prove a valuable source of inspiration and a good investment. Since I cannot imagine anyone not finding Kojève gripping, copies of it also can be found in the bookstore.

There are two useful one volume overviews of Hegel's thought: Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Blackwell); and Frederick Beiser, Hegel (Routledge) – both available in paperback. And we now have an extremely helpful and reliable intellectual biography of Hegel in English: Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge UP).

FALL SEMESTER

TOPIC ONE

Text: 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate'

Commentaries:

Williams Ch.4; J.M. Bernstein, "Love and Law: Hegel's Critique of Morality," Social Research 70/2 (Summer 2003)

Further Reading:

Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, Ch.4

Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp.2330, 3245

Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity, pp.20711, 253

✓ Axel Honneth, 'Moral Development and Social Struggle: Hegel's Early SocialPhilosophical Doctrines', in A Honneth, et.al.

(eds), CulturalPolitical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment

Sample Questions:

In what sense is Christianity a critique of moral theory?

What is presupposed by the thought that transgression entails selfdestruction?

If selfdestruction is the issue, what is the role of moral norms?

TOPIC TWO

Text: Phenomenology, Introduction, Paras. 7389.

Commentaries:

Harris (I), ch. 3

1st 75 pgs
+ 224-228

Lauer pp.2340
Pippin Ch.5
Williams Ch. 6
Pinkard pp.2028
Stern, Ch. 1

Further Reading:

M. Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience
W. Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Ch. V. part 2, Ch. VI.
K. Dove, 'Hegel's Phenomenological Method' Review of Metaphysics 23, (June 1970) pp. 615-641 (in Stewart)
K. Westphal, "Hegel's Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion" (in Stewart)
J. Habermas, 'Hegel's Critique of Kant', Knowledge and Human Interest, Ch. 1.
H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp.310-319.
M.A. Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground of History, pp 56-84.

Sample Questions:

What does Hegel understand by 'experience'? Who according to Hegel undergoes 'experience'?
Why does Hegel maintain that the critique of knowledge be abandoned?
Is Hegel's phenomenological method presuppositionless?

TOPIC THREE

Text: Phenomenology, SenseCertainty and Perception. Paras. 90-131.

Commentaries:

Harris (I), chs. 4-5
Hyppolite, pp.77-117
Lauer, pp.41-69
Westphal, pp. 123 and 59-91
Pippin, pp.116-131
Pinkard, pp.28-45
Stern, pp. 43-59

Further reading:

C. Taylor, Hegel, pp.140-147
C. Taylor "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology" in Hegel, (ed) A. MacIntyre.
L. Feuerbach 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy' The Fiery Book, esp. 76-79.
Ivan Soff, 'Charles Taylor's Hegel' The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.73, 1976, pp.697-710.
Reprinted in Michael M. Inwood, Hegel (Oxford University) pp.54-66.
A. Warminski 'Reading for Example: "SenseCertainty" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit',
Diacritics XI, 1981, pp.83-96. Reprinted in his Readings in Interpretation.

W deVries 'Hegel on Reference and Knowledge', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26, pp. 297-307

K. Dulkeit, "Can Hegel Refer to Particulars?" (in Stewart)

M. Westphal, "Hegel's Phenomenology of Perception" (in Stewart)

Sample Questions:

What does Hegel's discussion of sense-certainty and perception tell us about the nature of truth for these two forms of consciousness?

What do we learn about language from the discussion of sense-certainty?

In what way does the account of sense-certainty illustrate Hegel's phenomenological method?

TOPIC FOUR

Text: Phenomenology, Force and Understanding, paras. 132-165

Commentaries

Harris (I), chapter 6

Pippin, pp. 131-42

Pinkard, pp. 34-45

Westphal, ch. 4

Stern, pp. 59-70

Further Reading

J. Flay, "Hegel's 'Inverted world'" (in Stewart)

H-G Gadamer, "The Inverted World," in Hegel's Dialectic and The Review of Metaphysics 28 (1974/5).

Robert Brandom, "Holism and Idealism in Hegel's Phenomenology," in his Tales of the Mighty Dead

Chapter III, "Force and Understanding", is for me the most obscure in the text. While nearly everyone agrees on what the core argument must be, there is little agreement on details, and no account I have read is fully convincing. However, one cannot understand the transition to self-consciousness without some grasp of the overall movement of this chapter. Rather than getting bogged down here, I will aim to focus on what I take to be the core argument, emphasizing the beginning (§§132-136) and end (§§160-5) of the chapter. Almost all the standard commentaries have a chapter on "Force and Understanding", which can be consulted. Particularly valuable are the accounts by Westphal, Pippin, Flay, and, most notably, Gadamer's "The Inverted World", which can be found in his Hegel's Dialectic.

Sample questions

What is the purpose of the "inverted world" argument?

How does Hegel's account of explanation demonstrate that the ultimate good of scientific knowing is not representational?

What does Hegel mean by "infinity" in §§162-163?

TOPIC FIVE

Text: Phenomenology: "Lordship and Bondage" through to the "Unhappy Consciousness", Paras. 178-230. (Given the breadth of this chapter, you may write two commentaries on it—each of course covering different portions of it.)

Commentaries:

Harris (I), chs. 7-9.

Hyppolite pp.156-215

Lauer pp.100-124

Flay pp.81-112

Pippin pp.143-171

Williams Chs. 78

Pinkard Ch. 3

Stern, Ch. 3

Further Reading:

H.G. Gadamer, 'Hegel's Dialectic of Self-Consciousness' in Hegel's Dialectic

A. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Ch. 1 and Ch.2 to p.57.

Kelly 'Notes on Hegel's Lordship and Bondage' Review of Metaphysics XIX, 1966, pp.789 (in Stewart).

H. Adelman, "Of Human Bondage" (in Stewart)

S. Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom, Ch. 7.

H. Marcuse Reason and Revolution pp. 114-120.

I. Soll, An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics Ch. I.

J.M. Bernstein, 'From Self-Consciousness to Community' in The State and Civil Society ed. Z. Pelczynski, pp.143-9.

Paul Redding, Hegel's Hermeneutics, ch. 5 (this book is a generally rewarding general interpretation of Hegel's recognitive theory of spirit).

Marcuse Hegel's Ontology, ch. 21, pp.250-263.

Peter Simpson, Hegel's Transcendental Induction (a new attempt to make self-consciousness the key to the book as a whole)

Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche, chs. 5-6, 9.

G. Bataille, "Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice," Yale French Studies 78 (1990), pp. 9-28.

Jacques Derrida, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve" in Writing and Difference

J. Flay, "Hegel, Derrida, and Bataille's Laughter," with an important reply by Judith Butler in Wm. Desmond (ed.), Hegel and his Critics.

Judith Butler, "Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection: Rereading Hegel on the Unhappy Consciousness" in her The Psychic Life of Power, ch. 1.

Jean Wahl, "The Unhappy Consciousness" in Robert Stern (ed.), G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments, vol. II.

John O'Neill (ed.), Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition: Texts and Commentary (includes Marx, Kojève, Habermas, Sartre, etc. on the master/slave dialectic).
Robert Brandom, "Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism," in his Tales of the Mighty Dead

Sample Questions:

Describe the 'experience' of one of the forms of consciousness discussed in these sections.
Why must self-consciousness, my relationship to myself, be grounded in my relationship to another?
What is the role of death in the masterslave dialectic?
In what sense are "Stoicism" and "Scepticism" forms of self-consciousness?
Why is the "Unhappy Consciousness" the ultimate form of self-consciousness?

TOPIC SIX

Text: Phenomenology, Observing Reason, paras. 231-346

Commentaries:

Pippin, ch. 7
Harris (II), Ch. 1 (B) (a) (b), Ch. 2.
Hyppolite, pp. 219-258.
Lauer, pp. 131-5,
Flay, pp. 113-61.
Pinkard, ch. 4
Stern, pp. 97-133

Further Reading

H. Marcuse, Hegel's Ontology, chs. 22-3.
MacIntyre, "Hegel on Faces and Skulls" (in Stewart)

Sample Questions

What are Hegel's arguments against phrenology?
What is the relation of reason to idealism?
What does Hegel mean by the "infinite judgement" – "the self is a thing"?

SPRING SEMESTER

TOPIC SEVEN

Text: Phenomenology, "Acting" Reason (B, C), paras. 347-437

Commentaries

Harris (II), Ch. 1 (B) (a) (b), Ch. 2.

Hyppolite, pp. 250-320.

Lauer, pp. 148-56, 164-76

Flay, pp. 113-61.

Pinkard, ch. 4.

Stern, p. 114 -114

Further Reading:

Gary Shapiro, "Notes on the Animal Kingdom of the Spirit" (in Stewart)

Robert Pippin, "You Can't There from Here," in F. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel.

Rudiger Bittner, What Reason Demands

For further references on Hegel's critique of Kant's moral philosophy, see commentaries and further reading for topic eleven.

Sample Questions

What is the cause of "frenzy", the madness, of any one form of self-actualized reason?

What does Hegel mean by the idea of a spiritual "animal kingdom"?

Why is law-testing reason empty?

TOPIC EIGHT

Text: Phenomenology, Sittlichkeit (The Ethical Order), paras. 444-483.

Commentaries:

Harris (II), chs. 3-4.

Hyppolite pp.334-375

Lauer pp. 177-190

Westphal pp.138-146 and 153-160

Flay pp.164-182

Williams pp.192-204

Pinkard pp.135-150

Stern, pp. 135-147

Further Reading:

Hegel, The Philosophy of History Part II pp.223-277. And for paras. 477-483 read Part III

Introduction and para. III Ch. 1, pp.278-282 and 314-318.

A. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, pp.57-68.

G. Steiner, Antigones (Oxford University) pp.27-42.

P.J. Mills, "Hegel's Antigone", The Owl of Minerva Vol.17, no.2, Spring 1986, pp.131-152 and in Stewart).

Heidi M. Ravven, "Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists?", The Owl of Minerva 19/2 (Spring 1988), pp.149-168.

Benjamin Barber, "Spirit's Phoenix and History's Owl or The Incoherence of Dialectics in Hegel's Account of Women", Political Theory 16/1, (February 1988), pp.528.

Luce Irigaray, "The Eternal Irony of the Community", in P.J. Mills (ed), Feminist Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel. (Mills' own essay is also reprinted here.)

Tina Canterbury, "Looking at Hegel's Antigone Through Irigaray's Speculum" in her Ethics of Eros, Ch. 3.

Kimberly Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy, Ch. 4 (this book contains a fine summary of the feminist debates on Hegel, and an original line of its own)

Allen Speight, Hegel. Literature and the Problem of Agency, Ch. 2

Robert Bernasconi, "Persons and Masks: The Phenomenology of Spirit and its Laws", Cardozo Law Review vol 10 (1989), pp. 1695-1711.

It is helpful to know the plot of Sophocles' Antigone and also Hegel's discussion of it in his Aesthetics (see the index to Knox's translation).

Sample Questions:

What does ethical selfconsciousness experience in its deed? (Para 469).

How does it come about that 'ethical life' (Sittlichkeit), which is the immediate unity of substance with selfconsciousness, comes to confront an alien actuality?

What is the role of nature in the tragedy of ethical life?

What place is accorded to law in the ethical world?

TOPIC NINE

Text: Phenomenology, The World of Selfalienated Spirit, paras. 484-537

Commentaries:

Harris (II), Ch. 5

Hyppolite pp.376-425

Lauer pp.190-201

Westphal pp.160-166

Flay pp.183-193

Pinkard pp.150-165

Stern, pp. 147 -168

Further Reading:

S. Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel, pp.172-182

K. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and General Philosophy' Early Writings (Penguin), pp. 379-386.

D. Diderot, Rameau's Nephew (Penguin). For *espece* (type para. 489) see p.108. For the inversion of good and bad (para. 523) see especially pp. 83ff.

J.Hulbert, 'Diderot in the text of Hegel', Studies in Romanticism 22, 1981.
David Price, "Hegel's Intertextual Practice..." (in Stewart)
Allen Speight, Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency, Ch. 3.

Sample Questions:

What for Hegel is the experience of alienation?
Discuss the relation of the language of flattery to statepower and the relation of the language of base flattery to wealth?
What is the individual in search of in its flirtation with wealth and state power? Why does it not find it in them? (para 526).

TOPIC TEN

B. Text: Phenomenology. The Enlightenment, paras. 538-595.

Commentaries:

Harris (II), Chs. 6-7
Hyppolite pp.426-464
Lauer pp.201-213
Westphal pp.166-173
Flay pp.193-205
Pinkard pp.165-193

Further Readings:

Hinchman, Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment (Florida)
K. Nusser, "The French Revolution and Hegel's Phenomenology..." (in Stewart)
S. Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel, pp.183-211.
J. Hyppolite 'The Significance of the French Revolution in Hegel's Phenomenology' in his Studies on Marx and Hegel.
G.W.F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, pp.55-56.

Sample Questions:

How does Faith experience the Enlightenment?
What does it mean 'thinking in thinghood'? (para 578).
If every prejudice and superstition has been erased, what is the nature of the truth which the Enlightenment offers in their place?
What are Hegel's reservations about the notion of culture of Bildung? (See especially para. 594.) A useful account of the meaning of the German word is given in Gadamer's Truth and Method pp.1019, but Gadamer does not convey Hegel's critique of the world of culture.)
In what sense is the French Revolution an attempt to realize Absolute Freedom? What is Hegel's critique of Absolute Freedom?

TOPIC ELEVEN

Text: Phenomenology, Morality, paras. 596671

Commentaries:

Harris (II), Chs. 8-9

Hyppolite pp.467528

Lauer pp.213229

Westphal pp.173181

Flay pp.207226

Williams pp.206220

Pinkard pp.193220

Stern, pp. 168-182

Further Reading:

G.W.F. Hegel, Natural Law, pp. 112132.

J. Robinson, Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind (Toronto).

Benjamin Sax, 'Active Individuality and the Language of Confession', Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol XXI, 1983, pp.437466.

D. Hoy, 'Hegel's Morals' Dialogue 1981, vol.20, pp.86102.

R.Z. Friedman, 'Hypocrisy and the Highest Good: Hegel on Kant's Transition from Morality to Religion', Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, 1986, pp.503522.

Sally Sedgwick, "On the Relation of Pure Reason to Content: A Reply to Hegel's Critique of Formalism in Kant's Ethics", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49/1 (September 1988), pp.5879.

Allen Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, ch.10.

J.M.Bernstein, "Confession and Forgiveness: Hegel's Poetics of Action" in Richard Eldridge (ed.), Beyond Representation.

Allen Speight, Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency, ch. 4.

Robert Pippin, "Hegel's Ethical Rationalism," in his Idealism as Modernism.

For a standard rejoinder to Hegel's critique, see Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, ch. 10, AND

Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, ch. 7. Ch. 6 of Ameriks' book provide as useful overview of the Kant-Hegel dispute in relation to Kant's theoretical philosophy.

Sample Questions:

Why does Hegel associate Kant's Postulates with the 'moral view of the world'? In what way are the Postulates duplicitous?

What are the limits of conscience?

What is the role of language in attaining mutual recognition?

Why does the chapter on Spirit culminate in the discussion of evil and forgiveness?

TOPIC TWELVE

Text: Phenomenology, Religion paras. 632787 (In order to make this manageable in a couple

of weeks, sections A and B (natural religion and religion in the form of art) will be done together, leaving a week to focus on C, 'revealed religion,' esp. paras. 7807.)

Commentaries:

Harris (II), Ch. 10, pp. 521-547; Ch. 12.

Flay, 227-248

Hyppolite pp.529570

Lauer pp.230255

Westphal pp.187210

Williams Ch.10

Solomon Ch.10

Pinkard pp.221228, 252260

Stern, Ch. 6

Further Reading:

E. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Indiana University Press) ch.3.

Q. Lauer, 'Hegel on the Identity of Content in Religion and Philosophy' in Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, (ed.) D. Christensen (Nijhoff) pp.261278. Revised version in his Essays in Hegelian Dialectic.

W.H. Werkmeister, 'Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind as a Development of Kant's Basic Ontology' in Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, pp.93100.

And the essays by Viellard-Baron, Schondorf, and Nys in Stewart (ed.).

Sample Questions:

Why does Hegel turn to religion after completing the chapter on Spirit?

Why is Christianity the culmination of the chapter on Religion?

Discuss Hegel's treatment of Good and Evil in § 780.

TOPIC THIRTEEN

Text: Phenomenology, Absolute Knowing, Paras 788808

Commentaries:

Harris (II), Ch. 13

Flay, Ch. XI

Hyppolite, pp.573606

Lauer, pp.256269

Westphal, pp.211229

Williams, Ch. 11

Pinkard, pp.261268

Stern, Ch. 7

Further Reading:

Mitchell Miller, "The Attainment of the Absolute Standpoint in Hegel's Phenomenology" (in

Stewart).

M. Murray 'Time in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit', Review of Metaphysics June 1981 pp. 682705.

A. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel chs. 5 & 6.

M. Murray, Modern Philosophy of History, ch. 11.

T. O'Hagan, 'Must Time have a Stop', Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology vol. 15, no.3, October 1984 pp.231 242.

D. Verene, Hegel's Recollection, ch. 9

H. Marcuse, Hegel's Ontology, ch. 25, pp.305318

C. Lenhardt, 'Anamnestic Solidarity'

Sample Question:

What is the place accorded to history at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit?

TOPIC FOURTEEN

Text: Phenomenology, Preface, paras 172.

There is now an excellent new translation and commentary by Yirmiyahu Yovel, Hegel's Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Here I want to focus on the issue of language, the heart of Hegel's discussion of which concerns what he calls 'speculative propositions'.

Hegel's discussion of how speculative propositions are to be read can be found in paras. 5866 of the Preface. There is now an extensive secondary literature on the subject, including:

J.P. Surber 'Hegel's Speculative Sentence' HegelStudies Band 10, 1975, pp.211230.

HG Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp.416431

HG Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, pp.3033

W. Marx 'Reason and Language' in his Reason and World

J. Burbidge 'Language and Recognition' in Method and Speculation in Hegel's Phenomenology, (ed) M. Westhal, pp.8593

J. Simon "The Categories in the "Habitual" and in the "Speculative" Proposition" Contemporary German Philosophy Vol.3, D.E. Christensen et al. (eds.), pp.112137.

John Sallis, "Hegel's Concept of Presentation" (in Stewart).

Sample Questions:

What does Hegel understand by the phrase 'language is the existence of Spirit'? (See paras. 510, 520, 652 and 666).

What is a speculative proposition? Illustrate how they are to be read with examples from the main body of the text.

HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

PART TWO

(GPHI 6022)

PROFESSOR J. M. BERNSTEIN

This course is a continuation of "Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Part One". Detail of readings, bibliography, and writing assignments are all given in the syllabus to that course. Provided here is only week-by-week readings. Readings all refer to PhS, Miller translation.

WEEK 1: "Observing Reason", Ch. V (A): #231 - #346. [The critique of theoretical rationalism]

WEEK 2: "The actualization of rational self-consciousness through its own activity" and "Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself", Ch. V (B, C (a)): #347 - #418 [The critique of modern moral individualism]

WEEK 3: "Individuality..." (continued), and "The true spirit. The ethical order", Ch. V (C (b, c), Ch. 6 (A): #419 - 483. [The critique of Kant's formalism and the transition to Spirit] **First mini-commentary due**

WEEK 4: "The true spirit. The ethical order" (continued). [Antigone]

WEEKS 5 - 6: "Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture", Ch. VI (B): #484 - #595. [The critiques of the absolutist state, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution]
Second mini-commentary due week 6

WEEK 7: "Spirit that is certain of itself. Morality", Ch. VI (C (a, b)): #596 - #631. [Critique of Kant's "Postulates of Pure Practical Reason"]

WEEK 8: "Spirit that is certain of itself. Morality", Ch. VI (C (c)): # 632 - 671. [Conscience]

WEEK 9: "Religion", Ch. VII (A, B): #672 - #747. [Natural religion, and religion in the form of art, i.e., Greek art/religion] **Third mini-commentary due**

WEEK 10: "Religion", Ch. VII (C): #748 - #787. [Manifest - Christian - Religion]

WEEK 11: "Absolute Knowing" **Fourth mini-commentary due**

WEEK 12: "Preface" (esp. #59 - #67) [Speculative propositions]

Summary on the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology

1. Modern theory of knowledge, epistemology as first philosophy, is sceptical in that, first, it means to employ methodical scepticism as a means of overcoming social scepticism (Descartes' strategy in the First Meditation leading to the "cogito"); and secondly, it, presumptively, secures certainty in the form of non-inferential self-awareness that is detached from world-awareness. Hence, the programme of the theory of knowledge of clarifying our cognitive abilities independently of and prior to any form of object awareness presupposes the sceptical retreat that isolates self-consciousness from object consciousness.
2. Hegel offers only a weak *prima facie* argument against this procedure. First, by recalling for us the paradox of knowledge from the Meno (how can you hope to discover the truth about X without knowing what you are looking for), Hegel means to remind the modern epistemologist that the retreat to inner awareness does not alter the form of the paradox. Secondly, then, any claim about consciousness (e.g., the division into simple and complex ideas or ideas and impressions) must be formally realist in the same manner as the realism which generated the sceptical regress to consciousness. Thirdly, the turn to "knowing" as a separate faculty necessarily comes to make knowing a tool or an instrument, which either cuts it off from its object or insinuates a form of knowing—e.g., knowing appearances only—that leaves the truth itself elsewhere and non-cognitive (a matter of faith, say).
3. For Hegel the claim that we know appearances only and not things in themselves summarizes the claims and the dilemmas of epistemology. The sceptical remainder—things in themselves—problematizes the status of the reflective forms of knowing while recalling the question of the absolute.
4. The way around this dilemma is not to assume that we can know about knowing without being involved in the process of knowing. Knowledge ("science") must *appear*, where appearing involves precisely science's separating itself from opinion (or common sense) and giving an account of its superiority. But this means that true knowing involves two things: the knowledge and the account of it which justifies its claim to knowledge. This is already a fully modern position since it assumes the a valid account must be self-grounding. Holding to appearances and being self-grounding are equivalents. Any account of knowledge which keeps to these two moments, and shows how they are articulated, Hegel denominates with the term "self-consciousness".
5. The method of the Phenomenology is to survey all the substantive appearances of knowing. This can occur by means of an orderly progression because self-consciousness will provide an account of what it takes the Absolute (or truth or essence or the in itself) to be and an account of how knowing relates to it. This will be an acceptable procedure to Us because it assumes only the fundamentals of Kant's Copernican turn: every form of consciousness knows in accordance with its own "concept of an object" (= its idea of the absolute or truth, etc.).
6. All we have to ask is if the account of knowing and the projected conception of truth correspond, i.e., does that form of knowing capture the kind of object-awareness it claims in terms of its own concept of an object? Any failure of correspondence will occur for a particular reason or set of reasons. These particular reasons delimit the field which a succeeding account must make good. Hence, the collapse of a form of consciousness (= both a knowing and a concept of an object-world) is determinate. This is what Hegel means by determinate negation. Determinate negation is prospectively a narrative device and retrospectively explanatory. It is only a narrative device prospectively because we cannot presuppose that the series of determinate negations will end. Prospectively, the Phenomenology is a gamble, not a method. The gamble employs natural scepticism as a means. Like epistemology, Hegel means to employ scepticism to defeat scepticism. Natural scepticism embeds an erotic moment, a desire for knowledge and certainty that is the motor of dialectic (= the movement of forms of consciousness from one to another). The unfolding movement of forms of consciousness is the education of consciousness, its formation through the process of the internal, sceptical defeat of its various formations. Consciousness goes through an indefinite process of being formed, de-formed and re-formed. This is, in truth, a way of despair, not doubt, in that each sceptical defeat is the loss of "world", a loss of the self through that self losing its world, unlike

modern scepticism in which doubt eventuates in, formally, non-inferential self-awareness, and substantively, self-possession. The way of despair is a movement of processual self-dispossession (which is a clue about the end). Again, all this will be an education only if the process can conclude successfully. If it does not, then scepticism triumphs.

7. Because Hegel presupposes the validity of the Copernican turn, then the entire process can have only two possible results: the vindication of idealism or sceptical defeat. Hegel's entire practice assumes that realism, i.e., the mind-independence of the truth, is sceptical, and that therefore there cannot be a successful realist theory of knowledge.

8. Hegel can write a "phenomenology" is that he employs a descriptive method: the appearances of forms of consciousness. He can be descriptive in the sense that he does himself have to propose a criterion in order to evaluate the success or failure of the different forms of consciousness. Again, each form of consciousness provides its own criterion, its concept of an object. Hence, each form of consciousness measures itself, succeeding or failing in its own terms. This is what has led all commentators to the conclusion that the text is presuppositionless or methodologically neutral. As we have seen, this is false. The premise of the procedure is the idea that "consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, something exists for consciousness..." (para. 82). This business of distinguishing and relating presupposes the apparatus of Kantian synthesis, the projecting of a concept of an object, and the regulation of one's activities in accordance with that projection. not

9. Hegel entitles the movement of loss and the generation of a new object world "experience". To have an experience is, here, precisely the loss of self and world, and the generation of a new account of the self-world relation. Experience is categorial, it refers to the self-world relation as such. Understanding that what consciousness took to be an in-itself is in reality (only) a human projection (a for us), which brings about another conception of an in-itself is what we add to the process that consciousness simply undergoes or suffers. We transform what has simply happened into an orderly progression. Hence the claim that the Phenomenology is the "science of the experience of consciousness".

10. The conclusion of the process, absolute knowledge, absoluten Wissens, is not knowledge of the absolute, but the discovery that knowing is absolute or unconditioned, i.e., there is no perspective outside it that qualifies or conditions or limits it. This is equivalent to saying that the conclusion only states that scepticism (which derives from realism, which is equivalent to the belief that it makes sense to speak of a (human-)mind-independent truth about the world) is false.

11. We will begin with forms of consciousness that deny account giving, and hence which are not self-conscious, and hence fall below the methodological presuppositions that govern the movement of the text as a whole.

KNOWING

CONCEPT OF AN OBJECT (= TRUTH)

Sense-Certainty

A singular object (a this)

Perception

A singular object with properties (universals)

Understanding

Forces or a system of laws

JMB

8.2.96

agation that issues in an ideology critique — carried out from a third-person perspective — of the mixing of power claims and validity claims. Ever since Plato and Democritus, the history of philosophy has been dominated by two opposed impulses: One relentlessly elaborates the transcendent power of abstract reason and the emancipatory unconditionality of the intelligible, whereas the other strives to unmask the imaginary purity of reason in a materialist fashion.

In contrast, dialectical thought has enlisted the subversive power of materialism to undercut these false alternatives. It does not respond to the banishment of everything empirical from the realm of ideas merely by scornfully reducing relationships of validity to the powers that triumph behind their back. Rather, the theory of communicative action regards the dialectic of knowing and not knowing as embedded within the dialectic of successful and unsuccessful mutual understanding.

Communicative reason makes itself felt in the binding force of intersubjective understanding and reciprocal recognition. At the same time, it circumscribes the universe of a common form of life. Within this universe, the irrational cannot be separated from the rational in the same way as, according to Parmenides, ignorance could be separated from the kind of knowledge that, as the absolutely affirmative, rules over the "nothing." Following Jacob Böhme and Isaac Luria, Schelling correctly insisted that mistakes, crimes, and deceptions are not simply without reason; they are forms of manifestation of the inversion of reason. The violation of claims to truth, correctness, and sincerity affects the whole permeated by the bond of reason. There is no escape and no refuge for the few who are in the truth and are supposed to take their leave of the many who stay behind in the darkness of their blindness, as the day takes leave of the night. Any violation of the structures of rational life together, to which all lay claim, affects everyone equally. This is what the young Hegel meant by the ethical totality that is disturbed by the deed of the criminal and that can only be restored by insight into the indivisibility of suffering due to alienation. The same idea motivates Klaus Heinrich in his confrontation of Parmenides with Jonah.

Habermas

Magnificost Klaus Heinrich

JB

subproblem

secret d.t.t
@ (knows) unknown

② impossible
(knows) unknown

In the idea of the covenant made by Yahweh with the people of Israel, there is the germ of the dialectic of betrayal and avenging force: "Keeping the covenant with God is the symbol of fidelity; breaking this covenant is the model of betrayal. To keep faith with God is to keep faith with life-giving Being itself — in oneself and others. To deny it in any domain of being means breaking the covenant with God and betraying one's own foundation. ... Thus, betrayal of another is simultaneously betrayal of oneself; and every protest against betrayal is not just protest in one's own name, but in the name of the other at the same time. ... The idea that each being is potentially a 'covenant partner' in the fight against betrayal, including anyone who betrays himself and me, is the only counterbalance against the stoic resignation already formulated by Parmenides when he made a cut between those who know and the mass of the ignorant. The concept of 'enlightenment' and the mass of the ignorant. The concept of 'enlightenment' familiar to us is unthinkable without the concept of a potentially universal confederation against betrayal." Peirce and Mead were the first to raise this religious motif of a confederation to philosophical status in the form of a consensus theory of truth and a communication theory of society. The theory of communicative action joins itself with this pragmatist tradition; like Hegel in his early fragment on crime and punishment, it, too, lets itself be guided by an intuition that can be expressed in the concepts of the Old Testament as follows: In the restlessness of the real conditions of life, there broods an ambivalence that is due to the dialectic of betrayal and avenging force."

In fact, we can by no means always, or even only often, fulfill those improbable pragmatic presuppositions from which we nevertheless set forth in day-to-day communicative practice — and, in the sense of transcendental necessity, from which we have to set forth. For this reason, sociocultural forms of life stand under the structural restrictions of a communicative reason at once claimed and denied.

The reason operating in communicative action not only stands under, so to speak, external, situational constraints; its own conditions of possibility necessitate its branching out into the dimensions of historical time, social space, and body-cen-

his own person: "I absolve you . . ." But Hegel does not regard this as a performative. When Jesus said impersonally (as he usually did) "Your sins are forgiven you," it was clear that this could only be taken as true by a believer; it was not an action, but advice about the factual situation. This is what lies behind Hegel's renewed insistence that the will of God comes into being for consciousness: "through the third term, the mediator as *counselor*." In essence the claim that the mediator is a "counselor" asserts Luther's view of the indulgence controversy. We should remember that Luther was still a Catholic, when he protested about the sale of indulgences. He was only saying what Dante had said and shown, in and through the fate of Guido da Montefeltro. No mere human (not even the Pope) can perform the self-creative act of Reason as the Spirit. We can only *observe* it, and pass on the good news that it has happened.

The "syllogism" of which Hegel speaks here is the perfect *Vorstellung* of Reason. The sinful consciousness is related to God through a "third" who is like herself. The relating moment is a *speech*. As the speech of another sinful self, it can only be a "counsel," a description of the situation seen from an *observer's* standpoint. That other side is God's side, the side of the Unchangeable. "I absolve you," says the mediator "in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." The Unhappy Consciousness would not be unhappy if it did not see its own situation from that side, and if it did not identify with the view from that side; and now another self is announcing what God *wills*. The sinner is thus required to recognize that the Unchangeable does not will things to be other than they are. The way they are is its will. The total pattern of sin and penitence is *absolute*.

All of this is simply *observation* of how the Unchangeable is, and wills to be. Our finite desire for unity with the infinite, which creates in us the consciousness of *unhappiness*, the desire for self-abolition, is the Unchangeable will, and it is therefore *implicitly* the goal of our desire. This implicit side, this *Ansich* is only presented to us as *implicit* (or as a promise) in the words of the counselor. Our human part continues to be *sin*; and the Unhappy Consciousness is forever born again, because the saving action is all of it really on the other side, it is all the work of God.

The counseling voice says "I absolve you . . ." But this is not explicitly (or "for itself") an *absolute act* of the self. If we take it to be an act of *this singular self*, then we have the moral abortion of the supposed "indulgence." What is made *absolute* in the act of "counsel" is the total pattern of sin and penitence. Just how it can be absolute is still God's secret, but the whole pattern must be absolute if God is the Unchangeable. For the sinner it is not her penitence, but God's act that *makes* the pattern absolute; and God's side remains hidden, except for the words of the counselor who speaks in His name. Thus the certainty of absolution, of union with God, is a broken certainty; it remains split into the unhappiness of Here, and the happiness of the Beyond. Only the words of the counselor bridge the gap; and the counselor himself is the same consciousness of brokenness. He speaks "in the name of" the Beyond. The existence of the bridge is quite the opposite of rational. The "absolution" of my sin, its acceptance into the unchangeable unity of the infinite will, is quite incomprehensible.

But if we turn this absolution round the other way, if we make God's Will (the *object* into which the certainty of self-consciousness has resolved itself) into the subject of a new experience, then we have *Reason*. We cannot do this practically (i.e. performatively) because of the moral absurdity of a certificate of *indulgence*. But we can do it as theoretical *observers*, because the moment of subjective action in this experience is a *Vorstellung* of Reason. The sinner gives herself up, she says "I am nothing"; and in response the counselor gives her back to herself "in the name of God." As a result "God's will" takes over. Negatively, I give up my will. But I can only do that by accepting a higher will altogether. The mediator is essential, because only through his otherness can the otherness of this higher will be explicitly presented. It is only my voluntary surrender that makes this higher will possible, but if my surrender to God did not take the form of freely abdicating my autonomy of decision in favor of another like myself, this higher will could never become a real positive will at all. Thus the last act of the devout singular consciousness is the establishment of an authority recognized as *universal*.

This is not something that it knows it is doing. Hegel calls the mediator a "counselor" in order to force us to see what is happening. The Unhappy Consciousness takes God's will to be *there already*, waiting to absorb it so that His Will may be done on earth as it is in Heaven. According to what we can see, however, it is only the willing *surrender* of the sinner's self-will that makes it possible for God's will to exist at all. Similarly, in giving up possessions and enjoyment, the penitent consciousness takes itself to be only giving back to God what is His. The Universal that comes to be as a result of this is God's presence in the world as "the Church."

But for the devout consciousness that is the institution that the Savior left us. "Doing God's will on Earth" (which is what "absolution" means as the consummation of God's plan of salvation) is the "essence and object" of the devout life. But this identity of my will with God's, of my "being-for-self" with the objective universal, is precisely what is involved in *rational* thought and action. The concept of this identity is realized in the devout consciousness only as a momentary intuition, and even in the moment of absolution the certainty of it is another's, and it is broken. The sinner is absolved and blessed by the priest. But the priest acts in the name of God, and the reconciliation with God is just a miraculous moment. The same old struggle begins again every week. God's will is done; but it is *not* "done on earth as it is in Heaven." We do the sinning, and God does the forgiving. Our actions continue to flow in the sewer, and our "enjoyment" of them continues to be the pain of penitence.

The "experience" of the other side, the comprehension of the absolution, and the enjoyment of the blessing, is reserved for Heaven, the Beyond. But the act of *absolution* *requires* a rational syllogism. The three terms are all necessary. It is not the personal or singular act of the priest. He is the mediating term through whom God's will is united with that of the penitent. This identity of my will with God's is *Reason*. For the devout consciousness it exists in the inverted form of a *Vorstellung*—an object of thought, not an act of thinking. God's will comes into being as "authority," the willing acceptance of another's will. But the authority that another

of circulation and self-reproduction as the reproduction of meaning; henceforth, everything covered by the name lordship collapses into comedy. The independence of self-consciousness¹⁰ becomes laughable at the moment when it liberates itself by enslaving itself, when it starts to work, that is, when it enters into dialectics. Laughter alone exceeds dialectics and the dialectician: it bursts out only on the basis of an absolute renunciation of meaning, an absolute risking of death, what Hegel calls abstract negativity.¹¹ A negativity that never takes place, that never *presents* itself, because in doing so it would start to work again. A laughter that literally never *appears*, because it exceeds phenomenality in general, the absolute possibility of meaning. And the word "laughter" itself must be read in a burst, as its nucleus of meaning bursts in the direction of the system of the sovereign operation ("drunkenness, erotic effusion, sacrificial effusion, poetic effusion, heroic behavior, anger, absurdity," etc., cf. *Méthode de méditation*). This burst of laughter makes the difference between lordship and sovereignty shine, without *showing* it however and, above all, without saying it. Sovereignty, as we shall verify, is more and less than lordship, more or less free than it, for example; and what we are saying about the predicate "freedom" can be extended to every characteristic of lordship. Simultaneously more and less a lordship than lordship, sovereignty is totally other. Bataille pulls it out of dialectics. He withdraws it from the horizon of meaning and knowledge. And does so to such a degree that, despite the characteristics that make it resemble lordship, sovereignty is no longer a figure in the continuous chain of phenomenology. Resembling a phenomenological figure, trait for trait, sovereignty is the absolute alienation of all of them. And this difference would not be produced if the analogy was limited to a given abstract characteristic. Far from being an abstract negativity, sovereignty (the absolute degree of putting at stake), rather, must make the seriousness of meaning appear as an abstraction inscribed in play. Laughter, which constitutes sovereignty in its relation to death, is not a negativity, as has been said.¹² And it laughs at itself, a "major" laughter laughs at a "minor" laughter, for the sovereign operation also needs life—the life that welds the two lives together—in order to be in relation to itself in the pleasurable consumption of itself. Thus, it must simulate, after a fashion, the absolute risk, and it must laugh at this simulacrum. In the comedy that it thereby plays for itself, the burst of laughter is the almost-nothing into which meaning sinks, absolutely. "Philosophy," which "is work,"¹³ can do or say nothing about this laughter, for it should have "considered laughter first" (ibid.). This is why laughter is absent from the Hegelian system, and not in the manner of a negative or abstract side of it. "In the 'system' poetry, laughter, ecstasy are nothing. Hegel hastily gets rid of them: he knows no other aim than knowledge. To my eyes, his immense fatigue is linked to his horror of the blind spot" (EL, p. 142). What is laughable is the *submission* to the self-evidence of meaning, to the force of this imperative: that there must be meaning, that nothing must be definitely

lost in death, or further, that death should receive the signification of "abstract negativity," that a work must always be possible which, because it defers enjoyment, confers meaning, seriousness, and truth upon the "putting at stake." This submission is the essence and element of philosophy, of Hegelian ontologies. Absolute comicalness is the anguish experienced when confronted by expenditure on lost funds, by the absolute sacrifice of meaning: a sacrifice without return and without reserves. The notion of *Aufhebung* (the speculative concept par excellence, says Hegel, the concept whose untranslatable privilege is wielded by the German language)¹⁴ is laughable in that it signifies the *buying* of a discourse losing its breath as it reappropriates all negativity for itself, as it works the "putting at stake" into an *investment*, as it *amorizes* absolute expenditure, and as it gives meaning to death, thereby simultaneously blinding itself to the baselessness of the nonmeaning from which the basis of meaning is drawn, and in which this basis of meaning is exhausted. To be indifferent to the comedy of the *Aufhebung*, as was Hegel, is to blind oneself to the experience of the sacred, to the heedless sacrifice of presence and meaning. Thus is sketched out a figure of experience—but can one still use these two words?—irreducible to any phenomenology, a figure which finds itself *displaced* in phenomenology, like laughter in philosophy of the mind, and which mimes through sacrifice the absolute risk of death. Through this mime it simultaneously produces the risk of absolute death, the faint through which this risk can be lived, the impossibility of reading a sense or a truth in it, and the laughter which is confused, in the simulacrum, with the opening of the sacred. Describing this simulacrum, unthinkable for philosophy, philosophy's blind spot, Bataille must, of course, say it, feign to say it, in the Hegelian logoi:

I will speak later about the profound differences between the man of sacrifice, who operates ignorant (unconscious) of the ramifications of what he is doing, and the Sage (Hegel), who surrenders to a knowledge that, in his own eyes, is absolute. Despite these differences, it is always a question of manifesting the Negative (and always in a concrete form, that is, at the heart of the Totality whose constitutive elements are inseparable). The privileged manifestation of Negativity is death, but death, in truth, reveals nothing. In principle, death reveals to Man his natural, animal being, but the revelation never takes place. For once the animal being that has supported him is dead, the human being himself has ceased to exist. For man finally to be revealed to himself he would have to die, but he would have to do so while living—while watching himself cease to be. In other words, death itself would have to become (self) consciousness at the very moment when it annihilates consciousness being. In a sense this is what takes place (or at least is on the point of taking place, or which takes place in a fugitive, ungraspable manner) by means of a subterfuge. In sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies with the animal struck by death. Thus he dies while watching himself die, and even, after a fashion, dies of his own volition, as one with the sacrificial arm. But this is