

KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

GPHI 6065

SPRING 2006

PROFESSOR J M BERNSTEIN

Background reading and overview: Immanuel Kant by Otfried Hoffe, SUNY Press.

Kant's First Critique (hereafter: CPR) is the text for this semester. We will be using the translation by Norman Kemp-Smith, but feel free to consult the new translations by Pluhar, and Guyer and Wood. It is a complicated work, and you will need to use a commentary; the most useful advanced commentary is probably Henry Allison's Kant's Transcendental Idealism; the most useful mid-range commentary is Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (in the Routledge series). Copies of these texts are available from Barnes and Noble, 18th Street. I will place a more extensive selection of secondary literature in the Short Loan section of the library.

Writing Requirements. One cannot read Kant without writing at the same time. What is wanted are brief summaries (app. 750 words), in your own words, of the central arguments of the text. To this end everyone must write a mini-commentary on, at least, Topics 1-4, and 6. You are of course encouraged to write a mini-commentary on each topic. You will find this exercise invaluable. Because the course is too large for me to mark each commentary, you should break yourselves up into study groups of 3-4 students each, and each of you mark one another's commentaries. This will give you the opportunity to read the commentary of at least two other students, and force everyone to work out the details of the argument. In order for this exercise to be effective, it is essential that the commentaries be written at the correct time:

Commentary 1: before the third lecture

Commentary 2: before the fifth lecture

Commentary 3: before the seventh lecture

Commentary 4: before the ninth lecture

Commentary 5: before the twelfth lecture

You must include a copy of your five commentaries with your final paper. No one will receive a grade on their final essay unless they have submitted their five commentaries. Everyone will have one of their first three commentaries graded by me.

You can use the study questions below to guide you in writing your mini-commentaries, and in choosing a topic for your final paper. Given how difficult a writer Kant is, I strongly recommend that your final paper be the evaluation of some central stretch of the argument. The literature on Kant is excellent, and there are debates galore on every topic. If you want to do something less obvious for your final essay, get permission from me first.

The final essay is due on Monday, May 8.

Secondary Literature

Introductory

S. Korner, Kant

L. Goldmann, Immanuel Kant

R. Scruton, Kant

Reference: Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary

Commentary

N. Kemp-Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique

W.H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics

T.E. Wilkerson, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

C.D. Broad, Kant: An Introduction

K. Jaspers, Kant, a part of his The Great Philosophers, but also separately printed.

G. Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science

H. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism

P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge

Robert Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form

Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge

Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics

Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Theodor W. Adorno, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Arthur Collins, Possible Experience: Understanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason

Karl Ameriks, Interpreting Kant's Critiques

Eric Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality

A.B. Dickerson, Kant on Representation and Objectivity

Argument with Kant

P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense

J. Bennett, Kant's Analytic

J. Bennett, Kant's Dialectic

R.C.S. Walker, Kant

Reworking Kant

P.F. Strawson Individuals

Leslie Stevenson, The Metaphysics of Experience

Recent Collections of Articles on the First Critique

Allen Wood, ed., Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy

L.W. Beck, ed., Kant's Theory of Knowledge

R.C.S. Walker, ed., Kant on Pure Reason

Paul Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant

Eva Schaper & W Vossenkuhl, eds., Reading Kant

E Foster, ed., Kant's Transcendental Deductions

Patricia Kitcher, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays

COURSE OUTLINE

The Course Outline is a list of topics. Some will take less and others more than a week; the list is of only a guide to sequence.

Topic 1: The Copernican Turn and Transcendental Idealism

Read CPR, Introduction and also B735-766, The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic

Employment, which is Kant's criticism of the time-honoured analogy between mathematical and philosophical method.

Allison: Chs. 1 and 3 and pp. 133-6 on discussion of senses of object in CPR; Gardner, chs. 1-3.

Further: Wilkerson, Ch. I, Walsh, 1 and 2, on the general enterprise; W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View for modern criticism of an analytic/synthetic distinction; L.W. Beck, 'What Have We Learned from Kant?' in Wood, ed.; Philip Kitcher, 'Kant's A Priori Framework,' in Kitcher (ed.).

Why does Kant think that the intractable problems of metaphysics may yield if we work on the hypothesis not that knowledge conforms to objects, but that objects conform to our knowledge? Why does he call this a 'Copernican' turn? How does Kant reconstruct the distinction between 'reality' and 'appearance'? What is the point of saying that this move limits knowledge to make room for faith? What are the two distinctions between analytic and synthetic and between a priori and a posteriori? How are they related? Why is it important to Kant to draw two distinctions? Why is the claim that there are synthetic a priori judgments controversial? What is the difference between a transcendent metaphysics and transcendental inquiries? What do we now see about the nature of a 'critique' of reason? What are the implications of an 'anthropocentric' approach in philosophy?

Topic 2: Space, Time and Plurality

CPR, B33-73, Transcendental Aesthetic; Allison, Chs. 2, 4 & 5; Gardner, ch. 4.

Further: Walsh, 3-6; Wilkerson, ch. II; Bennett, Analytic, 5-20 (use the analytical table of contents for guidance; #17 is useful on concepts and intuitions); Strawson, Individuals, Part I section 2; Walker, Chs. IV & V; O'Neill, "Space and Objects", Journal of Philosophy, 1976; Lorne Falkenstein, 'Was Kant a Nativist?' in Kitcher (ed.). Parsons, "Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic" in Walker, ed.; Strawson, Individuals; Martin, selectively; Hintikka, 'On Kant's Mathematical intuitions' in Penelhum and MacIntosh, eds.; Margaret Wilson, 'The Phenomenalism of Kant and Berkeley', in Beck, ed.; Charles Parsons, 'The Transcendental Aesthetic', The Cambridge Companion to Kant.

Newtonian and Leibnizian views of space. Why does Kant reject both? How important are claims about geometry and arithmetic to Kant's argument? Why does he conclude that Space and Time are 'forms of intuition'? What is the contrast between intuitions and concepts? Between forms of intuition and concepts? Can you imagine a non-spatial world? Is it important whether you can? What does 'outer' mean? What does Kant mean when he says space is the form of outer sense? Is this a tautology? What is empirical realism? What is transcendental idealism? what are things in themselves?

Topic 3: Self and Categories

CPR B 74-109 and A 98-110; Fourth Paralogism, A367-380 and B409 Allison: 6, 12, 13.

Further: Descartes, Meditations, II; Hume, Treatise I.iv.vi; Walsh, 7-17; Bennett, Rationality; Arthur Melnick, Kant's Analogies of Experience, Ch. 1 (B, 4-5); Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgements; essays by Young and Guyer in Guyer (ed.); O'Neill, 'Transcendental Synthesis and Developmental Psychology', Kant-Studien, 1984; Patricia Kitcher, 'Kant's Real Self in Wood, ed.; R. Pippin, 'Kant on the Spontaneity of mind', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17/2 (1987); Jay Rosenberg, "'I think": Some Reflections on Kant's Paralogisms', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10(1986); C Thomas Powell, Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness, chs. 1,5; Dieter Henrich., 'The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction' in Schaper & Vossenkuhl (eds). Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, parts One and Two.

What is a category for Kant? What is the relation between categories and judgement? What is a metaphysical

deduction? Is the list of categories complete?

Why does Kant think that knowledge requires a certain sort of self-identity, the 'transcendental unity of apperception'? How does this self-identity differ from Cartesian and from Human selves? Does it follow from the claim that the elements of experience must be unifiable that they must be united according to specifiable principles? What is the difference between the claim that there are some categories or other, and the claim that all the categories there are can be listed? How seriously should we take the table of categories? How far is Kant committed to individualism? What, if anything, does he say about intersubjectivity? Should we expect general logic to give a clue to which categories there are? Why?

Topic 4: Objectivity and Transcendental Idealism

CPR, The Objective Deduction, B 129-175; The Refutation of Idealism, B 274-87. Allison: 7,14; Gardner, pp. 115 -165.

Further: Relevant sections in e.g. Allison, (Guyer, Wilkerson; 1). Henrich, 'The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction' in Walker, ed, or in Review of Metaphysics 1968-9 (difficult), and his 'Identity and Objectivity' which appears as ch.9 of his The Unity of Reason; J. Hartnack, 'B132 Revisited' in Beck, ed. Guyer, Part IV; Karl Ameriks, "Kant's transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument," in Kitcher (ed.); A.B. Dickerson, Kant on Representation and Objectivity. We shall not cover recent discussions of transcendental arguments; reading suggestions available on request.

What is a transcendental deduction? In what sense has Kant shown that experience has to be 'objective'? Will he satisfy sceptics? Is 'all my representations are my representations' a tautology? Does Kant's enterprise require transcendental arguments? Are they possible? (See also topic 2 refs. to Allison). What is the role of the categories in securing knowledge? To what extent is Kant's theory representationalist? Review your understanding of empirical realism and of transcendental idealism.

Topic 5: Schematism and the Transcendental Imagination

The Schematism of the Pure Concept of the Understanding, B 176-187.

Further: Allison, 8; Pippin, 5; Chipman in Walker (ed.); Heidegger.

What is the role of the schematism chapter? Does Kant need it? What are the consequences of handing over such authority to the imagination? Why does Heidegger regard the schematism as the secret core of Kant's theory of knowledge?

Topic 6: Causality and Knowledge of the World

CPR The Second Analogy - B232-256; also The Impossibility of a Sceptical Satisfaction Of the Pure Reason in its Internal Conflicts, B786-797

Allison, 9, 10

Further: Hume, Treatise, I.iii.xiv; Walsh, #25; Wilkerson, 76-81; Allison, 'Transcendental Affinity - Kant's Answer to Hume' in Beck, ed. Melnick, Kant's Analogies of Experience, chs. II-III. Michael Friedman, "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science," in Guyer (ed.). Eric Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality

Kant claims that the world must be casually ordered if we are to distinguish the order of mental events from the order of events in the world. With this he believes he refutes Humean scepticism about causal connections. But

does he? Are Kant and flume asking the same question? What sort of *self-knowledge* does the argument of the Second Analogy need? What - if anything - does it show about laws of nature? What can we know about 'the horizon of human reason'?

Topic 7: Things in Themselves and Noumena

The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects into Phenomena. and Noumena, B294-315;
Transcendental Dialectic, Introduction and Book I, The Concepts of Pure Reason, B 349- 396.
Allison, 11; Gardner, ch. 8.

Can Kant have a 'positive' doctrine of the thing in itself? Does he? Is 'noumenon' another word for 'thing in itself'? What is an 'Idea of Reason'?

Tonic 8: Freedom and the Limits of Reason

CPR, The Third Antinomy, and going on: B472-504, B 560-586, 671-5; 697-707; 735-740; 767-96; 824-31.
Allison, 15.

Ask how Kant can both make his strong claims for the unity and completeness of reason and offer the modest, critical account of the grounds of reason which we find in the Transcendental Dialectic. What is the Kantian enterprise? Did Kant renege on his own demolition of Deism?